What will come of the recent escalation in the West Bank?
Last week, rockets were fired from Jenin, in the West Bank, toward Israel for the first time in 18 years. This week, Israel launched its biggest operation in the West Bank in decades. Tension and violence are escalating between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank, but what is the cause, and what does this mean in the larger question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
The Israeli military operation in Jenin is a counter-terrorism campaign that is mainly a response to a string of terrorist attacks in recent weeks. On June 19, Israel launched a raid in Jenin in search of several Palestinian terrorists planning attacks in Israel, and they were quickly met with armed resistance (Lynfield, “Israeli Forces launch raid in Jenin”).
A day after this, on June 20, two Palestinians killed four Israelis at a settlement near Nablus, in the West Bank. Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, which operates out of Gaza, claimed responsibility for the gunmen (Gritten, Four Israelis killed by Palestinian gunmen”).
Four days later, on June 24, another terrorist, claimed to be a member of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, opened fire on Israeli soldiers at the major checkpoint connecting Ramallah and East Jerusalem (Fabian, “Shooting at checkpoint near Jerusalem”). The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is the military wing of Fatah, a Palestinian political group which lost the only election, in 2006, to Hamas but still has power in the West Bank.
Now, this week, after mounting tensions in the region, Israel has launched its biggest operation in the West Bank in two decades. Israel has announced that this counter-terrorism operation is to destabilize terrorist groups in the West Bank which have become too comfortable and too dangerous.
The operation has involved numerous drone strikes and an armed brigade on the ground, targeting terrorist hot spots in Jenin and in the refugee camp in the city. Israel has claimed that this operation is not aimed at taking and holding territory (Mckernan, “Biggest West Bank incursion in 20 years”), but to disable terrorists from carrying out attacks on Israel.
These recent terrorist attacks, and the Israeli response, is a result of decades of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The two have never been able to agree on borders or on coexistence, sparking several wars and many operations. This recent violence is an extension of the historic conflict, but it is influenced by modern issues, and it is being fought between complex parties.
The Palestinians launch terrorist attacks against Israel because they do not want the Jewish state to exist in the land they view as theirs. Several of the groups that hold power and operate in Palestinian land are not interested in a political solution, and often refuse to negotiate with Israel. The groups responsible for the recent attacks, mainly Hamas and Fatah, both have military wings that operate in the West Bank, and specifically in Jenin.
The groups receive much of their funding from Iran and call for radical Israeli cessions to achieve peace. Hamas wants Israel to fall back to the pre-1967 borders, they want to grant all Palestinians the right of return, and they want what is now Israel to become an Islamic state. Of course, these demands are impossible, and they are used as an excuse for violence.
Since Israel, obviously, refuses to cooperate with Palestinian demands, terrorist groups have been able to grow and operate in Palestinian land. Terrorist groups have found a safe haven in the West Bank, and specifically in Jenin, and the most recent Israeli operation shows that Israel refuses to allow terrorists to operate in the region. If Palestinian authorities continue to foster these terrorist groups, Israel may continue to launch operations against them, escalating the conflict between the parties.
This operation, the biggest in twenty years, may be a sign of more to come between Israel, the Palestinian groups in the West Bank, and the Palestinians across the rest of the region.
By Ethan Wenger – JIJ Intern
Unraveling the Trio: Understanding the Complexities of Saudi Arabia's Relationship with Israel, and the United States
When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, a key country was missing from the deal: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. By not signing the Accords, Saudi Arabia has kept its point of leverage in its negotiations with the United States and with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Saudi Arabia recognizes the power they hold in the Middle East, and they want to get the most from both the United States and Israel before they agree to normalize relations with the Jewish state.
Each combination of the three-sided relationship between Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia must be understood to grasp what it will take for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel.
First, it is important to understand the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Historically, the two states have been enemies. The Saudis voted against the United Nations Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan for Palestine, they have sent troops to fight the Israelis in several wars, and they have consistently supported the Palestinians in their efforts against Israel.
For one, the Saudis support the Palestinians in their fight for the land that currently belongs to Israel. In order for Saudi Arabia to make peace with Israel, the Saudis want Israel to adopt the Arab Peace Initiative (API). The API calls for Israel to pull out of territories gained in the 1967 war, for Israel to recognize a sovereign Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, and for Israel to solve the Palestinian refugee issue (“Arab Peace Initiative”). In this regard, “solving” the Palestinian refugee issue would mean losing Israel’s identity as the only Jewish state.
If Israel agrees to these conditions, then Saudi Arabia may move to normalize relations with them. But Israel cannot adopt these conditions, for they would be ceding valuable defensive holdings and giving too much to the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is using the Palestinians as leverage in the negotiations because they want an Arab-controlled Israel, and “the API regards the Arab-Israel normalization as the reward for solving the Israel-Palestinian dispute (Teller Abraham Accords: Saudi Arabia is still not budging).
Next, it is important to understand the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Abraham Accords were mediated by the United States, and Saudi Arabia has not signed the peace treaty because they wanted more from the Americans. In order to achieve peace, Prince Mohammed bin Salman “has told both Israeli and American officials that he wants Washington to treat Saudi Arabia as the major regional force he believes it is by resuming arms sales halted last fall and by offering the kind of security commitment it extends to close allies” (Traub, Netanyahu Has Drawn a Saudi-U.S Road Map).
Saudi Arabia wants to be on the good side of the American military, and the Americans have their priorities as well. The United States is intent on preventing Iran from creating its own nuclear weapons, and it would also prefer Saudi Arabia to be the dominant Middle Eastern state over Iran. With this, Saudi Arabia laid their claims on the table in recent talks with America. They want the U.S to support Saudi Arabia’s goal of building their own nuclear weapons; they want an American promise to defend Saudi Arabia in times of war, and they want the U.S to grant them special status as a major non-NATO ally (Nissenbaum, et al., Saudi Arabia Seeks U.S Security Pledges).
Again, these are steep demands by the Saudis. The United States does not want to support a nuclear Saudi Arabia, as this would lead to a nuclear arms race between them and Iran, which would turn into a disastrous situation. They also do not want to formally recognize Saudi Arabia as an ally, which would rope them into any future Middle Eastern conflicts.
The last relationship to understand in this trio is between the United States and Israel. Israel wants the United States to create peace with Saudi Arabia to further protect its position as a stable state in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is one of the most important countries not at peace with Israel, and an agreement between the two states would further solidify Israel’s place in the Middle East.
While the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not part of the trio negotiating peace, it is equally important as the others. For decades, the two states have battled over dominance in the Middle East. This has resulted in proxy warfare between the states, as in the Syrian Civil War and in the Yemeni Civil War. After years of tension, diplomacy between the states has become a recent possibility. In March, the leaders of the two states agreed to restore ties in agreement mediated by China. In this agreement, they said they will affirm “the respect for the sovereignty of states and the on-interference in internal affairs of states” (Gadzo, “Changing Global Order”). In a statement released by Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached “an agreement to resume diplomatic relations between them and re-open their embassies and missions” (“Joint Trilateral Statement”). While Saudi Arabia and Iran are still battling for Middle Eastern dominance, tensions between the two are softening while diplomacy is rising.
Despite Israel’s hope that the United States will strike peace with Saudi Arabia, the Saudi demands are too much for the Americans. The United States would not want to be forced to protect Saudi Arabia in times of war, and they certainly do not want the Saudis to have nuclear weapons. Israel and Saudi Arabia cannot achieve peace themselves, as well, because the Saudi claims for a sovereign Palestine are impossible for Israel to accept. As of now, the demands by the Saudis are too high, and unless they cede some of them, official peace will not be achieved.
By Ethan Wenger – JIJ Intern
Unraveling the Trio: Understanding the Complexities of Saudi Arabia's Relationship with Israel, and the United States
When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, a key country was missing from the deal: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. By not signing the Accords, Saudi Arabia has kept its point of leverage in its negotiations with the United States and with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Saudi Arabia recognizes the power they hold in the Middle East, and they want to get the most from both the United States and Israel before they agree to normalize relations with the Jewish state.
Each combination of the three-sided relationship between Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia must be understood to grasp what it will take for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel.
First, it is important to understand the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Historically, the two states have been enemies. The Saudis voted against the United Nations Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan for Palestine, they have sent troops to fight the Israelis in several wars, and they have consistently supported the Palestinians in their efforts against Israel.
For one, the Saudis support the Palestinians in their fight for the land that currently belongs to Israel. In order for Saudi Arabia to make peace with Israel, the Saudis want Israel to adopt the Arab Peace Initiative (API). The API calls for Israel to pull out of territories gained in the 1967 war, for Israel to recognize a sovereign Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, and for Israel to solve the Palestinian refugee issue (“Arab Peace Initiative”). In this regard, “solving” the Palestinian refugee issue would mean losing Israel’s identity as the only Jewish state.
If Israel agrees to these conditions, then Saudi Arabia may move to normalize relations with them. But Israel cannot adopt these conditions, for they would be ceding valuable defensive holdings and giving too much to the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is using the Palestinians as leverage in the negotiations because they want an Arab-controlled Israel, and “the API regards the Arab-Israel normalization as the reward for solving the Israel-Palestinian dispute (Teller Abraham Accords: Saudi Arabia is still not budging).
Next, it is important to understand the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Abraham Accords were mediated by the United States, and Saudi Arabia has not signed the peace treaty because they wanted more from the Americans. In order to achieve peace, Prince Mohammed bin Salman “has told both Israeli and American officials that he wants Washington to treat Saudi Arabia as the major regional force he believes it is by resuming arms sales halted last fall and by offering the kind of security commitment it extends to close allies” (Traub, Netanyahu Has Drawn a Saudi-U.S Road Map).
Saudi Arabia wants to be on the good side of the American military, and the Americans have their priorities as well. The United States is intent on preventing Iran from creating its own nuclear weapons, and it would also prefer Saudi Arabia to be the dominant Middle Eastern state over Iran. With this, Saudi Arabia laid their claims on the table in recent talks with America. They want the U.S to support Saudi Arabia’s goal of building their own nuclear weapons; they want an American promise to defend Saudi Arabia in times of war, and they want the U.S to grant them special status as a major non-NATO ally (Nissenbaum, et al., Saudi Arabia Seeks U.S Security Pledges).
Again, these are steep demands by the Saudis. The United States does not want to support a nuclear Saudi Arabia, as this would lead to a nuclear arms race between them and Iran, which would turn into a disastrous situation. They also do not want to formally recognize Saudi Arabia as an ally, which would rope them into any future Middle Eastern conflicts.
The last relationship to understand in this trio is between the United States and Israel. Israel wants the United States to create peace with Saudi Arabia to further protect its position as a stable state in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is one of the most important countries not at peace with Israel, and an agreement between the two states would further solidify Israel’s place in the Middle East.
While the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not part of the trio negotiating peace, it is equally important as the others. For decades, the two states have battled over dominance in the Middle East. This has resulted in proxy warfare between the states, as in the Syrian Civil War and in the Yemeni Civil War. After years of tension, diplomacy between the states has become a recent possibility. In March, the leaders of the two states agreed to restore ties in agreement mediated by China. In this agreement, they said they will affirm “the respect for the sovereignty of states and the on-interference in internal affairs of states” (Gadzo, “Changing Global Order”). In a statement released by Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached “an agreement to resume diplomatic relations between them and re-open their embassies and missions” (“Joint Trilateral Statement”). While Saudi Arabia and Iran are still battling for Middle Eastern dominance, tensions between the two are softening while diplomacy is rising.
Despite Israel’s hope that the United States will strike peace with Saudi Arabia, the Saudi demands are too much for the Americans. The United States would not want to be forced to protect Saudi Arabia in times of war, and they certainly do not want the Saudis to have nuclear weapons. Israel and Saudi Arabia cannot achieve peace themselves, as well, because the Saudi claims for a sovereign Palestine are impossible for Israel to accept. As of now, the demands by the Saudis are too high, and unless they cede some of them, official peace will not be achieved.
By Ethan Wenger – JIJ Intern
What Turkey’s Elections Mean for Israel
Turkey has elected Recep Tayyip Erdogan as their president in a runoff election. Erdogan, a member of the Justice and Development Party, or the AKP, ran on a promise to solve Turkey’s inflation problem, provide aid to those affected by the recent devastating earthquake, and solve the issue of Syrian refugees. Erdogan defeated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a member of the Republican People’s Party, by 52% to 48%. Kılıçdaroğlu ran on a hardline promise to rid Turkey of the refugees.
The AKP, Erdogan’s party, describes itself as a democratic conservative party that does not adhere to any religion. It is considered right-wing, with some experts labeling it far-right recently. Despite the party’s claims that it is not Islamic, most of its support comes from conservatives and Islamic people.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s party, the Republican People’s Party, is the other large political party in Turkey and is social democratic and Kemalist. The party follows six foundational principles, represented in the six arrows on their logo: republicanism, reformism, laicism, populism, nationalism, and statism. The party is more left-leaning socially, supporting LGBT and Women’s rights, alongside being pro-European and pro-NATO.
With Erdogan winning the election, Turkey can be expected to become more nationalist, conservative, and right-wing. The Turkish people have proven loyal to Erdogan, continuing to support him despite his government’s slow reaction to the earthquake and extreme inflation. They are dedicated to the Turkish leader who makes them proud to be Turkish, even though his policies and actions may not be politically in their best interest.
Now, what does this mean for Israel? The Turkish-Israeli relationship has a rocky history, even though Turkey was the first Muslim country to formalize relations with Israel in 1949. In the 2000s, there were several moments where the relationship faltered, stemming from instability in the Middle East and because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2017, Erdogan threatened to end its ties with Israel after the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In 2022, Erdogan met with then-Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, the first time the two state leaders had met in 14 years.
Even though Erdogan has been in power for many years, his stance on Israel has switched several times. Today, he has a realistic view of Israel's importance in the Middle East as a strong military and economic point. He views Israel in terms of what they can do for Turkey, and since Israel is prosperous today, he wants to maintain a good relationship with the state. Also, Erdogan may see Israel as a connection to the United States, which Turkey must keep strong.
Erdogan cannot be trusted to behave in any consistent way towards Israel. If a relationship with Israel is good for Turkey, Erdogan will continue establishing diplomatic ties. But if the tide turns and Turkey can no longer extract value from Israel, Erdogan is more than capable of cutting ties and ending the relationship.
By Ethan Wenger - JIJ Intern
What Turkey’s Elections Mean for Israel
Turkey has elected Recep Tayyip Erdogan as their president in a runoff election. Erdogan, a member of the Justice and Development Party, or the AKP, ran on a promise to solve Turkey’s inflation problem, provide aid to those affected by the recent devastating earthquake, and solve the issue of Syrian refugees. Erdogan defeated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a member of the Republican People’s Party, by 52% to 48%. Kılıçdaroğlu ran on a hardline promise to rid Turkey of the refugees.
The AKP, Erdogan’s party, describes itself as a democratic conservative party that does not adhere to any religion. It is considered right-wing, with some experts labeling it far-right recently. Despite the party’s claims that it is not Islamic, most of its support comes from conservatives and Islamic people.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s party, the Republican People’s Party, is the other large political party in Turkey and is social democratic and Kemalist. The party follows six foundational principles, represented in the six arrows on their logo: republicanism, reformism, laicism, populism, nationalism, and statism. The party is more left-leaning socially, supporting LGBT and Women’s rights, alongside being pro-European and pro-NATO.
With Erdogan winning the election, Turkey can be expected to become more nationalist, conservative, and right-wing. The Turkish people have proven loyal to Erdogan, continuing to support him despite his government’s slow reaction to the earthquake and extreme inflation. They are dedicated to the Turkish leader who makes them proud to be Turkish, even though his policies and actions may not be politically in their best interest.
Now, what does this mean for Israel? The Turkish-Israeli relationship has a rocky history, even though Turkey was the first Muslim country to formalize relations with Israel in 1949. In the 2000s, there were several moments where the relationship faltered, stemming from instability in the Middle East and because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2017, Erdogan threatened to end its ties with Israel after the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In 2022, Erdogan met with then-Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, the first time the two state leaders had met in 14 years.
Even though Erdogan has been in power for many years, his stance on Israel has switched several times. Today, he has a realistic view of Israel's importance in the Middle East as a strong military and economic point. He views Israel in terms of what they can do for Turkey, and since Israel is prosperous today, he wants to maintain a good relationship with the state. Also, Erdogan may see Israel as a connection to the United States, which Turkey must keep strong.
Erdogan cannot be trusted to behave in any consistent way towards Israel. If a relationship with Israel is good for Turkey, Erdogan will continue establishing diplomatic ties. But if the tide turns and Turkey can no longer extract value from Israel, Erdogan is more than capable of cutting ties and ending the relationship.
By Ethan Wenger - JIJ Intern
UN-Believable?
Article by Charlotte Van Der Gucht.
The UN report on the Gaza demonstrations condemns Israel. No surprise.
The weekly “great march” alongside the security fence was supposed to be a totally peaceful demonstration by Palestinian civilians. However, with Hamas working behind the scenes on the Palestinian side, this demonstration turned into a violent confrontation. In February of this year, the United Nations (UN) presented their findings on the Gaza demonstrations held between March and December 2018.
Both parties’ actions during the demonstrations were investigated. However, the UN report is largely dedicated to the condemnation of only one party, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). The commission mainly accuses IDF soldiers of killing demonstrators who didn’t pose an imminent threat to life, including children.
The UNknown: Objectivity is sought but rarely present
The UN’s report is drafted by an ‘independent international commission of inquiry’. But how reliable is such a commission if we look at the overall relation between the UN and Israel?
Every year for the past five years, over 20 UN resolutions have been directed against the only democracy in the Middle East, Israel. Whereas approximately 5 UN resolutions were directed at all countries in the world, combined! Let’s be clear: over a striking 80% of the UN resolutions were directed against Israel only. Israel does not claim to be faultless, but these numbers are astonishing.
Critical questions and concerns from members of the international community such as the UN are essential for the sake of justice. However, these numbers reveal a disproportionate targeting of Israel. It makes one wonder how objective this UN report is.
UNbelievable
“In the commission’s view, the demonstrations were civilian in nature.”
The report mentions that 183 allegedly ‘innocent’ Palestinians lost their lives. However, the statistics of the Intelligence and Terrorism information center (ITIC) confirm that “as for the identity of the fatalities 150 of 183 Palestinians were found to be affiliated with Hamas or with other terrorist organizations”.
The IDF qualified their actions by stating that members of Hamas were among the civilian protestors. They were responding to a new security threat, as the protests masked terror activities which include the launching of both incendiary kites and balloons filled with explosives. These in many cases were thrown by children. The devices caused many thousands of acres of farmland, animals and wildlife to burn creating an ecological disaster.
“Children are intentionally killed by the IDF”
35 of the 183 Palestinian losses were unfortunately children. The UN report accuses the IDF of having intentionally killed these children. But the real question is, who is responsible for these losses? The report does not reveal the sad context of Hamas using children as a method of warfare. Children are used as both human shields and child soldiers.
The education system in the Gaza strip, controlled by Hamas, systematically encourages children from a very young age to join the battle, to become martyrs. Later on, as adolescents they will attend summer camps where they will undergo military training. Ultimately, the children will be brainwashed to believe that Israel is their enemy, up to the point where they will join the demonstrations and risk their lives for the sake of Hamas. This is a despicable method, however, one that is never condemned by the UN.
Not only the Palestinian children, but the entire Palestinian population suffers under Hamas’ de facto control. Hundreds of protesters were paid to join the protests and others were coerced. Why did the UN report not mention this abuse even once? Again, critical reports and concerns on the conflict and demonstrations must be raised. But wouldn’t it be fair to investigate both sides with the same attention?
Adhering to international standards
It is beyond any dispute that alleged misconducts of IDF soldiers should be investigated and if necessary prosecuted. But the question is by whom? The UN calls upon the International Criminal Court (The ICC) in The Hague to investigate the actions of IDF soldiers. However, the ICC has no standing if Israel takes care of the investigations itself. This is what is called the principle of complementarity.
This principle is simple but ultra-relevant: The ICC cannot investigate alleged crimes when a country domestically opens a serious investigation adhering to international standards.
The Turkel Commission (consisting of independent international legal observers), in 2013, verified that the Israeli self-investigation system meets these international standards. An example of Israel’s willingness to scrutinize itself, is the case of IDF soldier, Elor Azaria.
Azaria shot in the head and fatally wounded a neutralized terrorist while standing less than 2 meters away from him. This disproportionate reaction has been investigated and led to the conviction of Elor Azaria for manslaughter on 4th of January 2017. This case proves that Israel is not afraid to investigate their own defense forces, although the investigations received a lot of criticism from the Israeli public. Examining your own defense forces is not a popular policy. Nevertheless, Israel continues to do so for the sake of justice and democracy.
Do your Job! Nikolay
An open letter to Nickolay Mladenov, supposed promoter of peace in the Middle East
The Honorable Nikolay Mladenov
UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
Dear Mr. Mladenov,
Your latest comments regarding the Israel/Gaza conflict leave me feeling confused. You are quoted saying, “If [the UN] stopped talking to Israelis and Palestinians about peace, Israel would come off as a lot worse in world media” (https://hamodia.com/2018/06/13/un-envoy-helping-gazans-comes-return-israeli-soldiers-remains/). From that comment, I can infer that you mean that the UN is helping Israel’s image improve with the rest of the world. I would very much like to hear you elaborate just how the UN is helping present a positive image of Israel on the world stage?
Was the UN attempting to support Israel and present a positive image when passing a resolution against Israel for its response to the Gaza border fence riots? It was admitted by a Hamas official, prior to the voting of the resolution, that 50 of the 62 rioters killed at the Gaza border riot were Hamas terrorists. Knowing this, the UN still voted 120-8 that Israel used excessive force. How can you say that Israel protecting its border from actual terrorists was unjustified? Resolutions like this, that unfairly target Israel and tell half-truths, make it appear, Mr. Nikolay Mladenov, that the UN is not preventing the worsening of Israel’s world image, but advocating for it.
Supporting Israel doesn’t have to mean saying positive things about the Jewish state. You could show support simply by being unbiased, and by disavowing countries or groups when they attempt to harm Israel. You don’t have to look hard to find an instance of Hamas doing something worth condemning. Hamas fires rockets from heavily populated areas into Israel which puts Gazan civilians at risk. Hamas places military compounds in the basements of schools and hospitals thereby endangering children and the sick. Most recently, Hamas sent terrorists to the Gaza border fence in an attempt to use a riot as a smokescreen to sneak into Israel and cause harm however possible. If the UN really cared about representing the Israel/Gaza conflict fairly, and not just trying to negatively paint Israel as the bad guy, wouldn’t the UN condemn some of these actions by Hamas?
Just recently, Nikki Haley, the United States’ ambassador to the UN proposed a resolution to condemn Hamas's violent border riots. What happened? The proposal didn’t even receive a 2/3 majority. Why couldn’t the UN condemn such an obvious wrongdoing by Hamas. Mr. Mladenov, this complete unwillingness to condemn even the most obvious violations gives the appearance that the UN does not want to “support both sides” as you say, but instead only criticize Israel.
Mr. Mladenov, your job as the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process is to, “lead the UN system in all political and diplomatic efforts related to the peace process in the Middle East and to coordinate the humanitarian and development work of UN agencies and programs in the occupied Palestinian territory, in support of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people.” How does your agency support a terrorist organization that has complete control over the Gaza Strip? Does your agency support legitimizing a terrorist group by giving them a country to control? How does supporting a group, whose mission is to destroy Israel, show Israelis that the UN is trying to protect Israel’s world image?
The United Nations is designed to prevent conflict. Instead of preparing for battle, countries should be able to come before the UN in agreement to prevent bloodshed. But when the UN consistently attacks only one side, it makes a State believe that their voice doesn’t matter, or even worse, that the UN is against them. Israel has time and time again shown restraint against its enemies while Hamas shows no such restraint in its plans to destroy Israel, kill Jews, and do so while killing its own citizens. You say that the UN helps support Israel’s image on the world stage, but your actions show otherwise.
Constantly waiting,
A concerned intern of the Jerusalem Institute of Justice
Article by Jared White
FACTS ON THE GROUND
As a Jewish millennial, I considered myself very informed on the situation in the Middle East, specifically with regards to Israel. After studying the conflict in college and receiving a degree in Middle Eastern Studies, I believed that I had developed a nuanced perspective from what I believed to be a diverse set of sources. However, when I began working at the Jerusalem Institute of Justice, I realized just how much of the picture I was missing and how much I still had to learn. The anti-Israel bias in the Western media became clear both in terms of how they portrayed the different sides in the conflict and especially on the information that they withheld from the public.
The BDS movement attempts to use this flow of information to its advantage. BDS leaders would have you believe that the only way to end the suffering of the people in the region is to boycott Israel. The movement conveniently leaves out any information that negatively portrays the Palestinians and their government as well as any information that reflects positively on Israel. It is due time for information to flow more freely and honestly so that people might truly understand the situation on the ground. With distorted facts come distorted opinions that do nothing to further dialogue or peace.
One of my first projects required me to research the difference in standards of living between that of Arab-Israeli women and those in Arab countries throughout the region. My research taught me a number of things. For example, while one can walk through the streets of Israel and see Arab women doing as they please, women are forbidden from many things in Gaza, like smoking hookah in public or running the Gaza marathon. Certainly more alarming, while Israel has a law making rape - including spousal rape - a felony punishable by 16 years in prison, a man in the Palestinian Authority could avoid prosecution for rape or sexual assault if he marries his victim due to a “marry-your-rapist” law.
I am shocked by the world’s silence regarding these laws targeting women in the Arab world. Yet, the United Nations dedicates extensive time towards chastising Israel for its treatment of women. With an increased focus on women’s rights, it is now time that the women under the control of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas receive the same attention and support from the international community.
My next projects focused on the BDS movement, something I fortunately had little interaction with on my college campus. There were stories circulating about the movement and its successes in convincing people of Israel’s supposed evils. BDS makes claims that Israel discriminates against the Arabs living in the country and highlights the harsh restrictions that Israel imposes on the movement of Palestinians. In reality, Arab-Israelis are an integral part of society, both academically and professionally. Arab-Israelis serve as Knesset members in both Arab and non-Arab parties and make up 16.1% of students in Israeli universities. Additionally, Arab citizens of Israel enjoy equal rights under the law, the same as their Jewish counterparts. In terms of the supposed “restriction of movement,” people blamed the security fence, which was built for and succeeded in preventing terror attacks. And even with this fence, over 100,000 Palestinians enter Israel every day for work. All this proves that these claims of discrimination are drastically exaggerated in service of a clearly dishonest agenda.
When reading about the region in the United States, it seemed that every little incident in Israel would be front-page news. The media loves pointing out Israel’s flaws, highlighting any instance that could be portrayed as an example of Israeli maltreatment of the Palestinians or its own Arab citizens. What was lacking was a comparable scrutiny of the governing bodies of the Palestinians. When the media does report on Hamas’ mistreatment of its citizens in Gaza, albeit infrequently, the Palestinian Authority does not receive any condemnation but is ignored for its corruption and the abuse of its people. In reality, Hamas steals electricity from its citizens while encouraging them to kill family members suspected of aiding Israel. At the same time, The Palestinian Authority works hard to silence any dissent, torturing journalists and others who attempt to speak out about the government’s abuses. In addition, rarely does one hear about the Palestinian Authority paying monthly salaries to families of terrorists. These are just some of the many abuses of power occurring in the Gaza Strip and West Bank that the Western media fail to adequately report. But why are these things not common knowledge among my peers? Where is the outrage from people who claim to care about human rights?
The BDS movement tries to change the narrative and distort the facts on the ground. It hopes that the incomplete and false media coverage of the situation will influence people to have a negative perception of Israel and to blame it for the conflict. This requires us to do our own research and learn the truth so that we do not let the BDS movement dictate the narrative and forge it as one of hate and lies.
The "Trump Effect" and Hamas
Donald Trump’s ascent to the United States presidency has had a domino effect on the Arab world, with the aftershocks directly targeting the Palestinian organization Hamas. Under Trump’s foreign policy, the president takes a hardliner approach to global terrorism. Trump hopes to defeat Islamic radical terrorism through partnering with other countries in “aggressive joint operations.” Trump also emphasizes that the United States is always happy when “old enemies become friends” and help aid in their military ventures. Various Arab leaders who have had rocky relations with past presidential administrations see this conciliatory approach as an opportunity and are making political decisions that align with Trump. Saudi Arabia specifically has benefited from the President’s willingness to look towards the future, evidenced by the recent meetings and arms deal between the two countries. The Palestinian Authority (PA), in preparation for their meeting with Trump as well as the resurgence of peace negotiations, cracked down on Hamas in Gaza. By cutting funding for electricity to Gaza, the PA is attempting to prove to Trump that they are committed to fighting against global terrorism. Differently than Obama, Donald Trump is willing to look past human rights concerns in favor of furthering his goal of eradicating global terrorism.
While President Trump has not issued any directive orders against Hamas, his demanding rhetoric has influenced Arab countries to act against the organization to curry favor with the United States. Originally, Hamas viewed the Trump presidency as an opportunity to restore relations with the US. They saw Trump as “having a greater threshold for boldness than [his] predecessors…could be a historic opportunity to pressure Israel.” Well aware of Trump’s policy towards terrorism combined with the rising humanitarian crisis in Gaza, Hamas knew that relations with the administration could make or break their ten-year regime in the territory. In early May, Hamas published a new policy document for the first time since their founding charter in the late 1980s. While Hamas leaders publically argue that this is part of the natural evolution of Hamas, the document appears to be largely moderated from their original position. They state that they are prepared to accept a two state solution with 1967 borders. Compared to their original stance that would not accept anything less than all of Israel, this an apparent large concession. Hamas also provides that their conflict is not with Jews specifically as a people, but with the “Zionist project”. In moderating their policy, Hamas is hoping to open a new era of relations with the United States to retain their power hold in the Gaza strip.
Much to the disappointment of Hamas leadership, President Trump was not swayed by their apparent mainstreaming. With many analysts calling the new document simply window dressing to appeal to Western audiences, the President’s administration barely acknowledged their change in policy. A few weeks later, Trump addressed 55 Arab countries at the Rihyad Summit in Saudi Arabia in which he emphasized the necessity of partnering with other countries to “stamp out extremism” and labeling Hamas as a terrorist organization. He repeated to the delegates present to “drive them out” and “strip them of their access to funds.” By formally connecting Hamas and his goal of eradicating terrorism, Trump laid out to these Arab countries a clear path to contracting better relations with the United States.
Just a few days later, four Arab countries spurred the President’s demands into action. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Qatar over their support for groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran that the United States categorized as terrorist entities. Qatar has invested millions into Gaza’s infrastructure, given substantial financial aid to the territory and also provides refuge for the organization’s exiled leaders. However, days after the beginning of the crisis, Qatar expelled Hamas leaders from Doha due to “unspecified pressure” as well as suspended electricity funding to Gaza. Hamas expressed their outrage at being ostracized by the Trump administration and the subsequent punishing of Qatar, one of their largest backers. A spokesman decried “the statement describing Hamas as a terror group…is a distortion of our image and shows a complete bias to the Zionist occupation.”
With this seemingly waning support from Qatar combined with the Palestinian’s Authority recent crack down on Hamas, the organization needs to secure partnerships with other actors in order to keep control of the Gaza strip and stay in power against the Palestinian Authority. As the humanitarian crisis will only escalate with the loss of funding and electricity, Hamas’ proximate actions will determine the organizations future. Their search is already bringing more contention to the region as they have begun to cozying up with more extreme factions such as Iran and Hezbollah due to regional isolation. The Palestinian Authority is also keeping a close eye on the reconciliation with exiled Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan who keeps close relations with Egyptian leadership.
Hamas’ true colors:
While Hamas seemingly moderated their policy in early March, the organization returned to their original extremist ideology just a few months later. In his first public speech to the people of Gaza in early July, the new political leader Ismail Haniyeh did not attempt to appeal to Western audiences and directly contradicts their new policy document. . Hamas’ hopes for negotiating with the US are extinguished due to regional developments such as the Gulf Crisis that was indirectly affected by Trump’s anti-terror rhetoric. Where Hamas conceded to accepting a two state solution with 1967 borders, the political leader calls for a Palestinian State that “can not give up a grain of soil” and “will foil any attempt to the so-called solution of ‘alternative homeland’.” He also refers to “schemes of Judaization,” detracting from the previous statement that Hamas’ issue is not with Jews but solely Zionism. He slams President Trump for labeling Hamas a terror organization, encouraging the “Zionist enemy” and “blackmail[ing] the Arab and Islamic forces” against the “Palestinian cause.” He also berates the Palestinian Authority for “responding to American dictations.”
Haniyeh is reacting to Trump’s foreign policy by crafting his speech to appeal to potential Arab backers. The Hamas leader hopes to quell some of the regional pressure against the organization by reaffirming their commitment to their “Arab brothers”. Haniyeh argues that Hamas is a resistance movement solely focused on furthering the Palestinian cause, that their issue is not with Arab countries but solely Israeli occupation. His promises are most likely directed at Egypt who has accused Hamas of aiding guerilla rebels within their country. Haniyeh claims that Arab countries will “only see virtue from Hamas and…wish[es] them security, stability and protection.” Haniyeh further paints a number of Arab countries as friends of the Gazan movement even as many of them have had cold ties with Hamas, in hopes of facilitating warmer relations. Haniyeh thanked Egypt, Qatar and Turkey for their historical and hopefully continued support of the Palestinian people in Gaza. He also labeled Saudi Arabia as an ally, even as the country condemns Hamas as a terrorist organization after meeting with Donald Trump. Most importantly, Haniyeh publically confirmed the organization’s ties with other US condemned extremist groups such as Iran. He thanked the country for “developing its military power,” confirming what had only previously been rumored throughout the Middle East.
Hamas looks for allies:
With Donald Trump indirectly influencing Gulf Countries, the Palestinian Authority and even Qatar to break with Hamas, the organization must secure other financial backers for survival. But although Egypt cut ties with Qatar after Donald Trump’s speech, the country and Hamas have been in recent talks. As the two share a border, reopening negotiations is critical for Hamas’ survival and in aiding the humanitarian crisis. Hamas and Egypt have had especially rocky relations since the 2013 overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, of which Hamas is a direct offshoot of. Since the coup, the Egyptian government has accused Hamas of being responsible for a number of attacks, to which the organization refutes. Egypt has further blockaded the Rafah border in an attempt to control smuggling of weapons into Egypt to support the government’s adversaries. In their new policy document, Hamas attempts to distance themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood by negating to mention their ties with the organization, in an effort to restore relations with Egypt.
Current talks between Hamas and Egypt are also being facilitated by the presence of former Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan. Once a high ranking official in the Palestinian Authority leading the fight against Hamas in 2006, Dahlan was exiled and expelled from Fatah in 2011 because he of his perceived threat to Abbas’ power. The former Hamas adversary sees Hamas’ isolation as an opportunity to align with the organization against the PA. Dahlan enjoys close relations with Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and has been acting as an intermediary in meetings between Egypt and Hamas. For his efforts, Dahlan would be allowed to return to Gaza to be in charge of foreign relations while Hamas keeps control over the territory’s security. After what Hamas called “9 days of constructive meetings with Cairo officials,” Egypt agreed to provide some electricity in exchange for a commitment to tighten security on the border to stop smuggling weapons into Egypt to aid government enemies. They also demanded that Hamas stop negotiations with Iran. In an effort to prove their commitment to the negotiations, Hamas began construction in late June on a no-go security zone to control and boost border security.
However, President Abbas is worried by the resurging negotiations between the two forces. The PA president needs Hamas at its weakest to regain control over the Gaza strip and to be seen as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people in future Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. As Abbas was set to meet with the Egyptian president in Cairo, purchased fuel from Egypt was drastically reduced in Gaza due to interference by the PA. Relations with Egypt may not only be subject to fissure due to external sabotage by Abbas, but also because of Hamas’ recent cozying up to Iran. As part of their negotiations, Egypt warned Gaza leadership not to reconcile with the country. Once the strongest of allies, Hamas and Iran have been at odds since 2012 when the Palestinian organization supported the wrong side in Syria. Subsequently, Iran cut off public relations and military aid. However, as the Trump administration has condemned both Iran and Hamas as terrorist entities, the two are facing regional isolation together and has only brought them closer. Iran is also pleased with the change in Hamas’ political leadership, as they favor Ismail Haniyeh over the former political chief Khaled Meshaal. After reportedly meeting with a delegation in Lebanon, Iran allegedly agreed to resume financial funding to Hamas in the near future. In Lebanon, Hamas began to reconcile with another labeled terror organization, Hezbollah, “under an Iranian umbrella”. The day after Haniyeh’s July speech that publically affirmed the reconciliation, another high ranking Hamas official declared the next day that ties with Iran are “as close and strong as ever.” If Hamas continues to entertain relations with Iran, budding negotiations with Egypt may dissolve even without the meddling of the Palestinian Authority. This would force Hamas to be almost completely dependent on Iran. This resurgence of alliances can only mean bad news for Israel as the two unite to carry out attacks from both Lebanon and Gaza.
While Donald Trump envisions his hardliner approach as the best way to combat terrorism, recent developments in the Middle East such as the Gulf Crisis and actions by the PA have only radicalized Hamas away from their attempt at moderating their policy in March. As the hot summer progresses and the humanitarian crisis only worsens, Hamas will pursue whatever course of action to maintain power in the Gaza Strip, with Iran seeming to be the most probable and reliable ally.
The Qatar Crisis: A Human Rights Issue Too
The recent decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain to sever diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar has been dominantly viewed through the lens of its political and security implications alongside Qatar’s alleged support for terrorist organizations. However, there are often-overlooked aspects of the commonly-called blockade that are worthy of a greater amount of consideration: human rights and international law. While there are other human rights challenges in Qatar, this article seeks to examine the effects of the recent crisis.
One component of the break in diplomatic ties between these GCC nations was a demand by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain for Qatari citizens to depart their countries within two weeks or face unspecified consequences. Similarly, these governments urged their citizens residing in Qatar to return home by this same deadline or potentially risk losing citizenship. Such a move may not sound extremely disruptive on face, but the action is nowhere near benign.
Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain – experience an extremely high level of economic and social integration with one another. In the 2001 Economic Agreement Between the GCC States, these nations made a binding commitment for GCC citizens to “be accorded, in any Member States, the same treatment accorded to its own citizens, without differentiation or discrimination, in all economic activities.” This meant that citizens of any GCC country had equal rights to purchase property, obtain healthcare, insurance, education, and other social services in any Gulf country they chose to reside in. In addition, citizens of Gulf states experienced freedom of movement – oft-considered a basic human right – to allow them to travel without restriction among the Gulf states.
As a result of this close integration, many individuals chose to pursue their education, find jobs, or start businesses in countries other than the one in which they held citizenship. It was customary to travel between the states regularly, especially given the frequency of flights between the nations. But, after the onset of the recent crisis, both Qataris in the condemning nations and citizens of those three countries in Qatar faced interruptions of their basic lifestyle choices. The high level of interdependence between these GCC states underscores the gravity of the recent actions taken, especially in the face of GCC agreements that ensure equal treatment to all GCC-nation citizens. The individuals affected by these measures number at least 13,000, according to the Qatar National Human Rights Committee.
These individuals could either depart from their current country of residence without any prospect of returning – leaving behind the life they made and likely losing their job – or they could stay, running the risk of losing citizenship in their native country. Neither option sounds particularly enticing, especially once various complications are considered. Students in university could be forced to leave prior to finishing exams. Patients undergoing medical treatment could have to choose whether to proceed with treatment or face the consequences of noncompliance with the mandates.
For mixed-nationality families, these challenges are particularly acute. Children with different citizenships than one of their parents could face separation, regardless of the age of the child. For families impacted by divorce or death of a parent, there could be even more complications. Although the blockade countries claim that special attention would be paid to such cases, little materialization of any altered standards has appeared.
Not only were citizens of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE required to return to their native countries, but there were also new standards instituted regarding “sympathizing” with Qatar. If any individual publicly makes a statement sympathy towards Qatar, whether it be on social media or in public, they could be liable for heavy fines or even imprisonment. In the UAE, for example, sympathizing with Qatar could result in imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of up to 500,000 dirhams.
In total, the blockade measures violate multiple international agreements, whether widely accepted standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or more specific agreements that apply to the countries involved, like the Arab Charter on Human Rights. The violations are similar across the various treaties; however, problems regarding enforcement arise given that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are not parties to many of the basic UN human rights treaties. The fact that these nations have not ratified such treaties itself should not be ignored, but for the time being, it is more relevant to focus on the agreements that these nations are signatories to, such as the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the GCC Human Rights Declaration. Although currently lacking an effective enforcement mechanism like an Arab Court of Human Rights, the standards set forth in the Arab Charter on Human Rights articulate binding norms that Arab nations agreed to. Similarly, the GCC Human Rights Declaration lists a set of goals that GCC countries want to aspire to regarding human rights. At the bottom of the page is an organized list of the articles of each agreement that the current actions violate.
Not only do the actions directly implicate international standards, but there are also consequences for individuals’ daily lives that simply result from the break in diplomatic and economic connections between the nations. Trade ties between the GCC countries have been a primary factor in the success of their respective economies. As such, the break in economic associations has radically altered the way that Qatar supplies its population with necessary economic goods and services. Food imports have been shifted – away from Saudi Arabia – towards Turkey and Iran. Due to the quick switch in economic partners, a complete replacement of all the goods that used to flow in from Saudi Arabia has not been possible. As such, greater food imports from places like Turkey primarily supply large supermarkets in Doha, putting strain on smaller grocery stores. Deficits of products, combined with high prices, will challenge individuals in Qatar, especially low-income families and migrant workers. In the short-term, access to food will continue to be limited, hampering individuals’ abilities to fulfill basic needs. To better prevent such shortages and broader economic losses long-term, Qatar is likely to further increase economic cooperation with Iran and Turkey, but it is precisely this move that may deepen the extent of the crisis.
The blockade countries presented Qatar a list of demands that, when fulfilled, would result in reinstated cooperation. Prominently featured are pleas to “curb diplomatic ties with Iran” and to “immediately terminate the Turkish military presence currently in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar.” The blockade countries threaten that if the demands are not complied with by July 3, then the list of demands will no longer be valid. Meanwhile, Qatar – looking to fill the cooperative vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain – finds increasing incentives to work with Iran and Turkey. As a result, compromising on the demands made by the blockade countries will only prove to be more difficult as the crisis continues.
The risks of the crisis continuing for an extended period of are manifold. Qatar has sufficient financial resources and flexibility not to immediately cave into all of the demands, but it cannot last forever without the cooperation of the blockade countries. Already hit with losses recently due to low energy prices – impacting the profitability of its main industry, LNG – Qatar finds itself in a less prosperous position. Yet, the perceived importance of the issues at stake for both sides ensure that no country will easily succumb. As the crisis continues, families will continue to be divided and economies on both sides will continue to be hard hit, impacting the basic lives of individuals across these nations.
The human rights questions posed by the blockade are of extreme importance, and should not be ignored. Although Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE claim to be taking these actions to criticize Qatar’s support for terrorist organizations like Hamas, ending Qatar’s support for Hamas will not necessarily result in a more peaceful outcome. According to Haim Malka of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), weakened financing streams from Qatar could lead to fragmentation of Hamas, potentially opening the door to infighting and increased violence from terrorist groups vying for power in Gaza. Regardless of the eventual outcome on terrorist organizations, human rights are inalienable, a relevant consideration when making any diplomatic decision. Before the crisis continues for an extended period of time, it is essential for the human rights considerations to be dealt with.
International Agreement Violations:
Freedom of Belief and Expression
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 3 - “Each State party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure to all individuals subject to its jurisdiction the right to enjoy the rights and freedoms set forth herein, without distinction on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religious belief, opinion, thought, national or social origin, wealth, birth or physical or mental disability.”
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 32 – “The present Charter guarantees the right to information and to freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium, regardless of geographical boundaries.”
GCC Human Rights Declaration, Article 9 – “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and exercising such freedom is guaranteed insofar as it accords with Islamic Sharia law, public order and the regulations (laws) regulating this area.”
Freedom of Movement
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 26 – “ 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State party shall, within that territory, have the right to freedom of movement and to freely choose his residence in any part of that territory in conformity with the laws in force. 2. No State party may expel a person who does not hold its nationality but is lawfully in its territory, other than in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and after that person has been allowed to submit a petition to the competent authority, unless compelling reasons of national security preclude it. Collective expulsion is prohibited under all circumstances.”
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 27 – “ 1. No one may be arbitrarily or unlawfully prevented from leaving any country, including his own, nor prohibited from residing, or compelled to reside, in any part of that country. 2. No one may be exiled from his country or prohibited from returning thereto.”
GCC Human Rights Declaration, Article 10 – “Freedom of movement, residence and departure is a right of every human being according to the regulations (law)”
GCC Human Rights Declaration, Article 11 – “No one shall be deported from his country or prevented from entering it”
Protection of the Family
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 33 – “2. The State and society shall ensure the protection of the family, the strengthening of family ties, the protection of its members and the prohibition of all forms of violence or abuse in the relations among its members, and particularly against women and children. They shall also ensure the necessary protection and care for mothers, children, older persons and persons with special needs and shall provide adolescents and young persons with the best opportunities for physical and mental development. 3. The States parties shall take all necessary legislative, administrative and judicial measures to guarantee the protection, survival, development and well-being of the child in an atmosphere of freedom and dignity and shall ensure, in all cases, that the child's best interests are the basic criterion for all measures taken in his regard, whether the child is at risk of delinquency or is a juvenile offender.”
GCC Human Rights Declaration, Article 14 – “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, originally composed of a man and a woman, governed by religion, morals and patriotism; its entity and bonds are maintained and reinforced by religion. Motherhood, childhood and members of the family are protected by religion as well as the State and society against all forms of abuse and domestic violence.”