The Other Palestinian Militant Groups
Given the well-known profile of Hamas, you may be forgiven for thinking that they are the only militant group in the Palestinian territories. Their famous green banners, softly-spoken leader Khaled Meshaal and rallies attended by tens of thousands have elevated their profile to global recognition. However, their military wing the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades are by no means the only militant group in the West Bank or Gaza Strip.
The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade are associated with the governing Fatah party and are, at least theoretically, a secular entity[1]. Rather than impose theocratic rule over Israel and the Palestinian territories, its intention is to expel Israelis from the territory by means of armed resistance. Believed to have been established in late 2000, the Brigade became proficient in the practice of suicide bombing – a trademark of Hamas. Examples of this include the suicide bombing on a bus in Rehavia in January 2004[2], and the twin-suicide bombing at the Tel Aviv bus station that killed 23 people in January 2003[3]. After the Palestinian intifadas and the international community’s intolerance of Palestinian terrorism, the group remained largely dormant. On July 26, 2007, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas announced the disarmament of ‘all the armed militias and irregular military or paramilitary groups’ existing in the Palestinian Authority[4]. The militiamen were ordered to turn in their weapons to the PA, sign a declaration renouncing terror and then had the option of being absorbed into the PA’s security forces. Conventional wisdom would suggest such a disarmament, in addition to Fatah’s adherence to the Oslo Accords and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s 1993 rejection of violence and terrorism, would negate the existence of a Fatah-affiliated military group.
However, during Operation Protective Edge in July 2014, their headquarters in the West Bank announced an ‘open war against the Zionist enemy in all [possible] ways with [operational] surprises, in accordance with all the laws and international conventions that bestow on us [the Palestinian people] the right to armed struggle so as to remove this occupation from all the Palestinian land[5]’. While their exact membership is unknown, they published a list in August 2016 detailing over 30 attacks they were responsible for between July and the first half of August. These include firing toward the Gush Etzion Junction on July 23 and August 10, as well as shooting near the settlement of Itamar on July 25[6].
The other important group is the Al-Quds Brigade, the armed wing of the Islamist movement Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). In terms of ideology, they are largely indistinguishable from Hamas and their military wing. They reject the idea of living alongside an Israeli state and advocate for continued armed resistance. The group operates primarily out of the Gaza Strip and to a lesser extent in the West Bank due to the PA’s security arrangements with Israel. In Gaza, they are known to work closely with Hamas and have coordinated rocket attacks together, according to PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah[7].
Other smaller groups, with limited military capabilities, include the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Harakat al-Sabireen. However, these groups suffer from limited financial assets and much of their intended recruitment goes to Hamas’ military wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ brigade and the Al-Quds brigade.
The challenge for Israel is how to engage an enemy that is a non-state entity. These groups operate in densely populated areas and often intentionally fire out of civilian infrastructure. Furthermore, many militants are often in contravention of international humanitarian customary and treaty law when they are either not appropriately uniformed or wear the uniforms of the Israeli military. One such example was the use of a van with a ‘TV’ insignia by members of the Al-Quds Brigade and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade to attack an Israeli military position on the border with Gaza in 2007[8]. Questions relating to the responsibility of militant groups to international humanitarian law are explored in the JIJ Report Hamas and the International Human Rights Law.
[1] Robinson, P. 2008, Dictionary of International Security, Polity Press, UK, p. 16
[2] Aderet, O. 2010, ‘The Intifada That Was’, Haaretz, October 1, viewed 8 March 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/the-intifada-that-was-1.316608
[3] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, ‘Suicide bombing at old central bus station in Tel-Aviv-5-Jan-2003’, January 5, viewed 9 March 2017, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2003/Pages/Suicide%20bombing%20at%20old%20central%20bus%20station%20in%20Tel-.aspx
[4] Abbas cited in Halevi, J. D. 2014, ‘The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Military Wing of Fatah, Is Officially Returning to Armed Struggle and Terror’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 20, viewed 9 March 2017, http://jcpa.org/al-aqsa-martyrs-brigades-military-wing-fatah/
[5] Halevi, J. D. 2014, ‘The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Military Wing of Fatah, Is Officially Returning to Armed Struggle and Terror’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 20, viewed 9 March 2017, http://jcpa.org/al-aqsa-martyrs-brigades-military-wing-fatah/
[6] ibid
[7] Hashem, A. 2014, ‘Islamic Jihad leader: negotiations gain “nothing”’, Al-Monitor, March 14, viewed 9 March 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/islamic-jihad-pa-israel-ramadan-abdullah-shalah.html
[8] Human Rights Watch 2007, ‘Gaza: Armed Palestinian Groups Commit Grave Crimes’, June 13, viewed 9 March 2017, http://pantheon.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2007/06/13/isrlpa16156.htm
Terror Tunnels: An International Legal Perspective
Perhaps the most significant feature of 2014’s Operation Protective Edge was the emergence of the terror tunnel phenomenon. Unlike Hamas’ traditional modus operandi of rocket attacks from Gaza, the tunnel phenomenon showcased the alarming ability of Hamas militants to burrow behind enemy lines into Israeli territory and launch attacks on towns and kibbutzim.
Amid reports that Israel might need to consider a threat of Hezbollah tunnels in northern Israel, we analyze the applicability of international law to these tunnels.
Given the recent emergence of the tunnels, their limited use around the world, and their ineffectiveness to state actors, international law does not specifically outline prohibitions on their use. Such is the view of Israeli international legal expert Professor Daphne Richemond-Barak, who noted ‘there is no legal literature’ on the issue and even ‘very little military theory and strategy’. Instead, we are forced to rely on relevant international humanitarian treaty and customary law.
The most obvious contravention of international law relates to the tunnels’ ability to assist in aggression against both Israeli targets and its territorial integrity. Although self-defense is guaranteed to member states of the United Nations by Article 51 of the UN Charter, Hamas’ claims of the tunnel’s ‘defensive’ nature are dubious at best. Many of the now-destroyed tunnels extended into areas of Israel without military targets, such as those with exit points close to the kibbutzim of Kerem Shalom, Holit and Nir Oz. Thus, the tunnels are understood to pose an intentional threat toward civilian targets within Israeli territory – well beyond the pretext of self-defense.
The exit points of these tunnels are not the only areas in violation of international law. The positioning of these tunnels’ entry points is also of significance, particularly as it relates to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV). The central theme of this treaty is the separation of civilians from military personnel to safeguard the wellbeing of non-combatants. Alarmingly, many of the tunnels’ entry points emanate from civilian areas and infrastructure such as mosques, schools and apartment blocks. This is in contravention of the following international laws:
- Article 28 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV
- Articles 12(4) and 51(7) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions
- Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the 1998 International Criminal Court Statute
- Customary International Law
Richemond-Barak also notes the significant risk posed to children in the construction of the tunnels. As argued in a Journal of Palestine Studies article of 2012, by Hamas’ own admission at least 160 individuals had died in constructing the tunnels at the time of the article’s publishing. Alarmingly, an extremely high number of these are believed to be children as they are ‘prized for their nimble bodies’.
Furthermore, the way in which these tunnels must be eliminated also makes Hamas liable for violations of international law. The aforementioned access points of the tunnels (in mosques, schools, apartment blocks etc.) inevitably means that their dismantlement will result in damage to civilian infrastructure and endanger the lives of civilians themselves. Mapping the paths and structural integrity of the tunnels is extremely difficult and rarely accurate. For those tasked with destroying the tunnels, there is a substantial element of ‘unknown’ in doing so; increasing the likelihood of unforeseen damage to Gazan civilians and their infrastructure.
Thus, in the absence of international law that deals specifically with the phenomenon of terror tunnels, one must apply existing relevant international humanitarian laws and norms to the issue. In doing so, one can establish that the use of underground terror tunnels is undeniably contrary to international law and a war crime.
International leader Ismail Haniyeh
Ismail Haniyeh
The recent replacement of Khaled Meshaal with Ismail Haniyeh as Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau signals a major shift in the inertia that has characterized the group in recent decades. Meshaal has served in his current role for over 20 years, while Haniyeh served as the disputed Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority between 2006 and 2014.
So how much do we know about Hamas’ future leader? And what can we expect from the man who has enemies not only in Israel, but also among the Palestinian political establishment?
Early Life & Background
Haniyeh was born in 1963 in the Al-Shati Refugee Camp in the north of the Gaza Strip – at that time under Egyptian military occupation. His parents originated from Ashkelon, but became refugees after fleeing the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
He attended schools run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and graduated from the Islamic University of Gaza with a degree in Arabic literature. During these years he became involved with Hamas and served as the head of the students’ council representing the Muslim Brotherhood (The Islamic University of Gaza’s founder happens to be Mahmoud al-Zahar – one of the co-founders of Hamas). He graduated at the same time as the first intifada, which likely helped to formulate his antagonism toward Israel and his esteem for armed resistance. He was given a short prison sentence by Israeli authorities in Gaza for his role in the protests and was detained again in 1988 and imprisoned for 6 months. In 1989, he was again imprisoned for three years.
Haniyeh was released in 1992 and was deported by Israeli authorities to Lebanon with senior Hamas leaders and 400 other activists. Using Lebanon as their base, they garnered substantial support and media exposure – both in the Middle East and around the world. He was able to return to Gaza in 1993 and was appointed Dean of the Islamic University of Gaza.
In 1997, he became the head of the office of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin – the spiritual leader and one of the co-founders of Hamas. The two men enjoyed a close relationship, leading to Haniyeh also serving as the group’s representative to the Palestinian Authority.
Amid the second Intifada, Hamas’ popularity surged as a response to the perceived success of armed resistance and suicide bombing. Furthermore, with many members of Hamas’ leadership being assassinated by Israeli security forces, Haniyeh was able to avoid competing with factional and personal rivals within Hamas for more authoritative positions.
Movement Through Hamas
Haniyeh’s ascension through the Hamas ranks also drew increased attention from Israeli security focus. In line with Israel’s policy of targeting leaders complicit in terror attacks against Israelis, Haniyeh and Yassin were slightly injured in an Israeli airstrike on an apartment block in Gaza city in September 2013. Six months later, Yassin was killed in a targeted assassination by an Israeli helicopter. As the spiritual leader, co-founder and close friend of Haniyeh, Yassin’s assassination more than likely strengthened Haniyeh’s loathing of Israel. Following Yassin’s assassination, Abdel-Aziz Rantissi was appointed his successor in Gaza. However, he too was assassinated in April 2014. Because of these efficient assassinations, Hamas decided to install a secret ‘collective leadership’ with Haniyeh, Mahmoud al-Zahar and Said al-Siyam.
In December 2005, Haniyeh was chosen to head the Hamas list in the Palestinian legislative elections. In the elections the following month, Hamas won a commanding majority with 76 seats out of a possible 132. Fatah won the next most seats with 43. Haniyeh was then confirmed as Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority and was asked by President Mahmoud Abbas to form a government.
Weeks of negotiations regarding a coalition with Fatah and other factions failed, and Haniyeh was forced to appoint a cabinet comprised primarily of Hamas members. This new cabinet was met with skepticism and repudiation from the US and the EU, both of whom threatened to cut funding to the Palestinian Authority unless Hamas renounced violence and recognized Israel. Haniyeh did not meet these requests and pleaded with them to not carry out their threats.
Strained Relations with Fatah
On December 14, 2016, an assassination attempt occurred at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt that killed one of Haniyeh’s bodyguards and injured his son. Hamas consequently blamed Fatah for the assassination attempt.
In June 2007, after a week of fierce fighting between Hamas and Fatah, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip. President Abbas subsequently dissolved the Hamas-dominated government and dismissed Haniyeh as Prime Minister. Unsurprisingly, Haniyeh rejected the move and presented himself as the de facto Prime Minister - and would remain so up until June 2014.
Since that time, his role has been characterized by two main activities: trying to reach a reconciliation/unity agreement with Fatah and continuing the policy of mukawama (armed resistance) against Israel and its citizens. No elections have been held in the Gaza Strip since 2006, enabling Hamas to cement their control of the territory.
As the most senior official of the Gazan government, Haniyeh is understood to be responsible for the human rights abuses and war crimes emanating from Hamas in the territory. This means that, among other incidents, he is liable for:
- 3,278 rocket attacks on Israel in 2008
- 2,248 rocket attacks on Israel in 2012
- 4,562 rocket attacks on Israel between 8 July-26 August 2014
- The summary, extrajudicial executions of at least 23 people in July/August 2014
Personal Life
Haniyeh has thirteen children. He is thought to have become a millionaire through over 2,500 square meters of land in Gaza as well as selling subsidized fuel for profit. Three of his sisters, Kholidia, Laila and Sabah, are citizens of Israel and live in the Bedouin town of Tel as-Sabi near Beersheva.
In early 2012, Israeli authorities granted permission for Haniyeh’s sister and her critically ill husband to travel to Rabin Medical Center in Petah Tikva to receive emergency heart treatment. Similarly, in addition to several other members of Haniyeh’s family, his daughter spent a week in a Tel Aviv hospital for emergency treatment in October 2014.
Future Prospects
Amid the change in leadership, the continuity of past Hamas behavior will remain. Although the group will vote on a new charter in the near-future, they are not expected to renounce violence or support any of the norms laid out in the Oslo Accords of 1993. Due to pressure from the international community and media, they may do away with various anti-Semitic articles of the charter such as ‘The Day of Judgment will not come until Muslims fight the Jews, when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say, “O Muslim, O servant of God, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him”’.
His attitude toward both Israel and Fatah is not likely to be any warmer than his predecessor. He would harbor added enmity toward Israel for destroying his house in 2014’s Operation Protective Edge and for assassinating his mentor Sheikh Yassin. In relation to Fatah, he no doubt still resents the fact that he was dismissed as the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority in favor of Third Way’s Salam Fayyad. Known as a firebrand public speaker, he is likely to be received more poorly by the international community than the erudite and softly-spoken Meshaal. Coupled with the volatile militancy he displays at Hamas rallies, it does not bode well for those hoping for peace and stability.
Your Regret Has Been Duly Noted
The recent decision of the U.S. to withdraw from UNESCO triggered an expression of profound regret by its director, but begs the question, “... and what took you so long?”
Led by President Reagan, the U.S. played hooky from UNESCO from 1984 to 2003 on the grounds that the organization “extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with, (and) has exhibited hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press.” That invites repetition of the old joke, “But aside from that, Mrs. Lincoln, what did you think of the play?
The same sound grounds for withdrawal from UNESCO have been well-publicized for the past five years. Could withdrawal have anything to do, for instance, with past decisions to include the writings of Che Guevara in UNESCO’s “memory of the world” register? The reappointment of Syria to a committee dealing with human rights? Formation of a Unesco chair at the Islamic University of Gaza - an institution tied to Hamas? Or, maybe, giving out a life-sciences award that was sponsored by Africa’s longest-ruling dictator?
While the decision’s timing may have caught Israel by surprise, the decision process had been underway for some time, with Israel’s knowledge and participation. It hardly exposes a grave lack of mutual coordination. Otherwise, Netanyahu could not have joined hands mere hours after the decision became public, thus avoiding charges of collusion between Israel and the United States.
Claiming, typically, to know Americans best, UNESCO’s Director General argued that “universality” drives detailed goals shared by the American people themselves, and should take priority over non-payment of America’s financial dues. Yet Irina Bukova knows that financial withdrawal in 2011 was mandated by U.S. law after UNESCO admitted ‘Palestine’ as a full member. This served as an advance warning of stronger steps to come, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s personal determination to subvert Congressional intent and restore participation without conditions. Or is Bukova using diplomatic sarcasm to blast Trump for choosing money over human need, an obligation she will oh-so-nobly defer?
Even the New York Times placed the key decision-point in its headline and lead, though bracketed, with quotation marks: “What it (the Trump administration) called the group’s ‘anti-Israel’ bias’. " Since no one had demanded the U.S. pay up, tying withdrawal to finances may not rise to the level of fake news, but its frequent mention in media coverage amounts to mere journalistic noise.
By contrast, the National Geographic, a long-time apologist for UNESCO, detailed the crucial connection between its mission to protect World Heritage Sites, actual (not merely ‘claimed’) anti-Israel bias and American withdrawal. Having determined in 2001, that the Temple Mount shall be named and referenced as always-and-only a protected Muslim holy site, this summer’s UNESCO decision to contradict Moses and declare Hebron the historic heritage of Palestinians probably served as the tippingpoint to three months of internal American and Israeli consultation.
(below, Cave of the Patriarchs, Hebron)
Arguably, the U.S. withdrawal has as much to do with image as substance. Yet, in the U.N. and, even more so, the Middle East, image and substance often prove to be one and the same.
Then again, just possibly the tide may be turning in favor of historic truth over narrative fictions. "I think it's a catastrophic decision," said Daniel Rondeau, a former French envoy to the body. "It's a fracture that seriously jeopardizes the very nature of UNESCO - its universal dimension - and the very concept of multilateralism." Given the perverse ways that UNESCO defines and acts upon so-called ‘universal’ and ‘multilateral’ values, one can only hope that Rondeau’s fears are justified, and that the doors of this theatre of the absurd will, indeed, close.
Egypt: A Return to Martial Law
In the last decade, Egypt has experienced some of the most monumental political shifts in the modern history of the Middle East. In 2011, after 30 years of authoritarian rule under President Hosni Mubarak, the revolutionary sentiments of the Arab Spring gained a foothold among the Egyptian people. A combination of mass demonstrations, civil disobedience and strikes resulted in the overthrow of the Mubarak regime on 11 February, 2011.
Following the overthrow, Egypt was governed by a military junta until it appointed Mohammed Morsi as its first democratically-elected president on 24 June 2012. Morsi, of the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, affirmed that the Egyptian people were the true source of power in their country. “You grant it, and you withdraw it”, he declared to the public when he took a symbolic oath of office in Tahrir Square. Although incidences of police brutality and government overreach were reduced under Morsi’s presidency, he drew international condemnation for polarizing relations between Egypt’s majority Muslim community and its sizeable Coptic minority community, as well as his inability to prevent violence directed at the Coptic community.
In July 2013, just over a year into his presidency, Morsi was overthrown by the military in a coup d’état. Following the coup, the constitution was suspended and in May 2014 army chief General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was elected President by an overwhelming majority of 93%.
Since that time, his presidency has been characterized by authoritarian rule and the systematic curtailing of human rights and civil liberties in the Middle East’s most populous nation.
Freedom of Expression/Freedom of the Media
The suppression of media freedom by Egyptian authorities is perhaps the most internationally-recognized issue pertaining to Egypt’s human rights record. The most noteworthy case involves the three Al Jazeera journalists Mohamed Fahmy, Peter Greste and Baher Mohamed. The trio were arrested in December 2013 on charges of news reporting that was ‘damaging to national security’, and were held in solitary confinement for a month before any formal charges were made. In late December 2013, they were given multi-year prison sentences after a trial in which prosecutors failed to present any credible evidence of criminal wrongdoing, although all three men have now been freed because of immense pressure from the international community.
In a more recent case, Misr 25 journalist Khaled Abdel Wahab Radwan was sentenced to 15 years in prison. It followed his arrest in March 2014 on espionage charges, although it is widely believed to be an attempt to silence criticism of President el-Sisi - as Misr 25 was owned by the Muslim Brotherhood[1]. Three of Radwan’s colleagues, who were tried in absentia, were sentenced to death for sending documents to their broadcaster’s headquarters in Doha for journalistic purposes[2].
Wider non-journalistic expression is similarly suppressed by the Egyptian government. A Human Rights Watch report published in 2015 stated:
‘Authorities detained dozens of people for such offences as possessing flyers with anti-military slogans, rapping in public against the police, or displaying signs commemorating victims of the Rab’a [the violent dispersal of sit-in protestors by Egyptian military and police personnel that resulted in the deaths of at least 817 people] dispersal. Journalists, academics, former lawmakers and human rights defenders were among those charged with crimes or banned from travel outside Egypt[3.’
Although Egypt’s constitution guarantees freedom of religion, authorities have prosecuted writers and activists on charges of ‘contempt of religion’ and ‘blasphemy. Such was the case with author Karam Saber, who was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison in 2013 for ‘contempt of religion’[4].
Capital Punishment
Contrary to the majority of UN member states and key provisions of international customary and treaty law, Egypt retains the use of the death penalty. A wide variety of crimes - including non-violent crimes such as drug possession, treason, and desertion - can carry a death penalty. Under the presidency of el-Sisi, the number of executions has increased significantly. No executions were performed in 2012 and 2013 (before el-Sisi ascended to the presidency), while 15, 22, and 44 executions were carried out in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively (el-Sisi became president in 2014).
For countries that do retain the death penalty, international law mandates effective safeguards and protections for those on trial for capital offences. Regrettably, Egypt has not met many of these requirements. For example, in March and April of 2014, a criminal court handed down the death penalty to more than 1,200 people allegedly involved in a terrorist attack. The judge did not allow the defendants the right to mount a meaningful defence or ensure that all had access to counsel[5]. The first trial, which resulted in 529 death sentences, lasted less than an hour, and only 74 defendants were present. The court also barred some defence lawyers from attending. In the second trial, which yielded 683 death sentences, none of the defendants attended.
As recently as April 2017, Human Rights Watch reported and published a video of Egyptian security forces carrying out summary executions in the Sinai Peninsula. In the video, two unarmed detainees are shot in the head. According to Joe Stork, of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East section, testimony had been collected suggesting security forces have been removing prisoners from detention centres and executing them.
Ambiguous Criminal Offences
The Egyptian government’s authoritarian proclivities have seen a reintroduction of crimes that, although intended to maintain national security and enforce the rule of law, carry vague meaning and questionable legal validity. Under the presidency of el-Sisi, people have been convicted on charges of receiving foreign funding to damage Egypt’s ‘national interests’, ‘peace’, ‘unity’ or ‘security’; as well as ‘insulting the president’ and ‘misusing social media platforms’. In addition, a law passed in 2013 allowed the Interior Ministry to ban and forcefully disperse protests and arrest participants on ambiguous grounds such as ‘imped[ing] citizens’ interests’. By having such vague criminal offences enshrined in the Egyptian legal system, it imparts a substantial degree of subjectivity onto cases where people are accused of such crimes. Hence, should the Egyptian government decide to silence or incarcerate their critics, there is legal recourse to invoke a charge as dubious as ‘working to disrupt unity’ to arbitrarily punish them.
Torture and Ill-Treatment
In recent years, Egypt has displayed an alarmingly high number of incidences of torture and ill-treatment within their correctional facilities. Prisons are notoriously overcrowded, with those accused of more severe crimes consigned to sections of facilities that are more dangerous and derelict. For example, in the aforementioned case of the Al Jazeera journalists, Peter Greste was held in the main section of the notorious Tora prison complex, whilst his two colleagues accused of more serious crimes were held in the far more draconian Scorpion prison built for convicted terrorists. Although the main section of the complex is cramped, severely overcrowded and poorly ventilated, the Scorpion section inmates had to sleep on the floor in mosquito-infested cells in solitary confinement.
According to an investigation by the Egyptian newspaper Al Watan, at least 90 people died in 2014 in local police stations and security directorates in the governorates of Cairo and Giza alone[5]. Furthermore, there is also widespread reports of severe beatings during arrests, arrival at police stations and transfers between prisons. Many complaints have been made of torture, including through the use of electric shocks, to coerce confessions[6].
Women’s Rights
Egyptian women remain particularly vulnerable to sexual and physical abuse due to antiquated cultural attitudes, legal loopholes, and systemic impunity granted to perpetrators by judicial and police authorities. Although el-Sisi’s government has pledged his commitment to combat domestic and sexual violence against women, the alarmingly high rates of abuse suggest either an inability or unwillingness to tackle the problem. For example, a ministerial committee formed by the President on the issue of harassment has not even proposed a law on violence against women. To date, no such law exists that criminalizes domestic violence[7].
Egypt also has some of the highest rates of female genital mutilation (FGM) in the world. A 2013 report by UNICEF revealed 91% of Egyptian girls and women have undergone some form of FGM[26]. Egypt also had the highest number of incidents (27.2 million) of the countries examined in the report. Such an endemic occurrence of FGM stands in strong contrast to the prohibitions set out in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women of 1993.
Conclusion
As the most populous nation in the Middle East, Egypt plays an important role both regionally and internationally. Given its sovereignty over the Suez Canal and its strategic location between Africa, Europe and the Middle East, its security and stability is a significant priority for the international community. It has portrayed itself as the key bulwark against terrorism and religious extremism. However, in doing so, it has eschewed the hallmarks of democracy and the rule of law in favour of authoritarianism. The fundamental human rights of free speech, freedom of assembly and the right to a fair trial have been systemically eroded. Egypt is party to core treaties of international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981) and the Convention Against Torture (1987). As such, any authority exercised toward Egyptian citizenry should be exercised in a manner that holds human rights as sacrosanct and corresponds with their international legal obligations.
[1] Tadros, M. 2013, ‘The Brothers and the Copts’, Middle East Institute, August 12, viewed 5 June 2017,
[2] Committee to Protect Journalists, op. cit.
[3] Human Rights Watch 2015, op. cit.
[4] Ibid.
[5 Human Rights Watch 2015, op. cit.
[5] Human Rights Watch 2015, op. cit.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
Israel would cease to exist within 25 years
This visual displays the hatefull rhetoric that the leader of Iran's military espouses to the world regarding the State of Israel's continuity, safety, and peace.
