Hamas Charter 1988 vs 2017: Why Rhetoric Has Never Meant ReformSaturday 24/01/2026

Originally published 2017 | Updated January 2026

For many years, Hamas’ Charter of 1988 has undermined their legitimacy within the international community. Many advocates in favor of Palestinian independence have found themselves unable to endorse the violence, antisemitism, and calls for genocide contained within the document.

In 2017, Hamas released a revised document titled “General Principles and Policies” in an attempt to rebrand their public image. It served as an affirmation of their ideologies and positions on issues relating to Israel.

Nearly a decade later, and in the shadow of the October 7 massacre, this effort at rebranding can be assessed with greater clarity. From a legal perspective, the revised document did not constitute ideological reform. It was a strategic exercise in linguistic moderation that left Hamas’ core objectives intact and legally indefensible.

The Contradiction at the Heart of Hamas’ Position

The 2017 document provides insight into Hamas’ willingness, or lack thereof, to coexist with an Israeli state:

“Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.” [i]

This is an oxymoron of a policy, requiring intellectual gymnastics to understand both its consistency and logic. Acceptance of a state along the pre-1967 armistice lines denotes a willingness or reluctant acceptance to live alongside an Israeli state, rather than a “full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea.” The two positions are incompatible.

Their so-called “acceptance” of a state is essentially an acceptance of a starting point from which to appropriate modern-day Israel. This was admitted by senior Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahhar in 2011, who referred to the acceptance of the pre-1967 lines as “just a phase” until Hamas has a chance to “regain the land, even if we [Hamas] have to do so inch by inch.” [ii]

Following this logic, Brazil could hypothetically accept a state in Rio de Janeiro yet maintain the entire territorial integrity of modern-day Brazil. Or, more appropriately, the Islamic State could accept a state in Raqqa, Syria, yet maintain its ambitions to establish a Caliphate from Spain to Afghanistan.

Under international law, recognition is not symbolic. It is a prerequisite for durable sovereignty, stable borders, and peaceful relations between states. Hamas’ position reduces the concept of statehood to a tactical waypoint rather than a terminal political solution. From a legal standpoint, such a posture fails the minimum threshold of good faith required for participation in any peace process.

Antisemitism in the 1988 Hamas Charter

The 1988 Charter contains conspiratorial antisemitic accusations of Jewish and Zionist domination of global institutions, as well as insinuations about the malevolence of Jewish people:

“Writers, intellectuals, media people, orators, educators and teachers, and all the various sectors in the Arab and Islamic world – all of them are called upon to perform their role, and to fulfil their duty, because of the ferocity of the Zionist offensive and the Zionist influence in many countries exercised through financial and media control, as well as the consequences that all this lead to in the greater part of the world.” [iii]

“The Zionist plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying.” [iv]

“Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and the Moslem people. “May the cowards never sleep.” [v]

“The Jews made no exception for women or children. Their policy of striking fear in the heart is meant for all. They attack people where their breadwinning is concerned, extorting their money and threatening their honour.” [vi]

Calls for Violence and Genocide in the Original Charter

The original 1988 Charter did not just draw attention to the supposed true aspirations of world Jewry. It openly advocated for violence and genocide against Jewish people:

“We should not forget to remind every Moslem that when the Jews conquered the Holy City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and proclaimed that “Mohammed is dead, and his descendants are all women.” [vii]

However, the original 1988 Charter did not just draw attention to the supposed true aspirations of world Jewry. Rather, they openly advocated for violence and genocide against Jewish people:

“In face of the Jews’ usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised” [viii]

“Arab and Islamic Peoples should augment by further steps on their part; Islamic groupings all over the Arab world should also do the same, since all of these are the best-equipped for the future role in the fight with the warmongering Jews” [ix]

“Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious” [x]

“The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree, (evidently a certain kind of tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews.” (related by al-Bukhari and Moslem) [xi]

The 2017 Document: Antisemitism by Substitution

The revised document is careful to adopt a more palatable tone regarding Jewish people:

“Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine. Yet, it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity.” [xii]

The term “Jews” has been euphemistically replaced with the term “Zionists.” This semantic shift does not withstand legal scrutiny.

When “Zionists” are portrayed as a monolithic global force, accused of controlling international institutions, denied historical or cultural ties to the land, and stripped of the right to national self-determination, the distinction collapses. Contemporary international standards, including those adopted by the U.S. State Department, the EU, and numerous international bodies, recognize that denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination or the legitimacy of Israel’s existence constitutes modern antisemitism.

The revised language does not abandon antisemitic tropes; it repackages them in terms more palatable to diplomatic audiences.

The Muslim Brotherhood Connection

The revised document presents a major shift in Hamas’ public acknowledgement of its ideological and political affiliation. It makes no mention of The Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement designated as a terrorist organization in Russia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. This is despite the fact that Hamas emerged as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and is referenced in the original 1988 Charter:

“The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times.” [xv]

Although Hamas has not commented on the Brotherhood’s omission from its new document, it is likely an attempt to garner favor with regional players such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia who have designated the group as a terrorist organization.

Yet omission is not disavowal. There is no evidence of ideological severance, operational distancing, or repudiation of the Brotherhood’s core worldview. The silence reflects a tactical calculation aimed at diplomatic maneuvering rather than genuine transformation.

The Persistence of Violent Doctrine

Crucially, Hamas has never renounced violence against civilians. The 2017 document does not repudiate the 1988 Charter’s endorsement of armed struggle, nor does it disavow the religious framing of violence as an obligation.

This is not merely a rhetorical omission. In international humanitarian law, intent matters, but conduct matters more. The systematic targeting of civilians, hostage-taking, sexual violence, and indiscriminate attacks are prohibited per se, regardless of political grievance. These acts constitute war crimes and, in certain contexts, crimes against humanity.

The events of October 7, 2023, eliminated any residual ambiguity about Hamas’ operational doctrine. They demonstrated continuity, not rupture, between ideology and action.

Hamas Leaders Confirm: The Charter Remains

For those who viewed the revised document as a step in the right direction, senior Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahhar clarified in May 2017 that its revised document did not contradict its founding Charter of 1988:

“The pledge Hamas made before God was to liberate all of Palestine…The Charter is the core of [Hamas’] position and the mechanism of this position is the document…We have reaffirmed the unchanging constant principles that we do not recognize Israel; we do not recognize the land occupied in 1948 as belonging to Israel and we do not recognize that the people who came here (Jews) own this land.” [xvii]

Law, Not Language, Determines Legitimacy

Under international law, legitimacy is not conferred by revised phrasing or selective omissions. It is earned through demonstrable compliance with legal norms: recognition of existing states, renunciation of violence against civilians, adherence to humanitarian law, and acceptance of peaceful dispute resolution.

Hamas has met none of these criteria.

The lesson of the past decade is clear: rhetoric cannot substitute for responsibility. Hamas’ revised language did not signal ideological evolution; it signaled strategic adaptation.

International law is not deceived by euphemism. It judges actors by their objectives, conduct, and adherence to binding norms. On all three counts, Hamas remains in fundamental violation of the principles that govern lawful political participation and the protection of human rights.

Rebranding does not erase responsibility. And moderation in words, when contradicted by violence in practice, carries no legal weight.

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References

  1. [i] Hamas 2017, A Document of General Principles & Policies, May 1, viewed 11 May 2017, http://hamas.ps/en/post/678/
  2. [ii] Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) 2011, ‘Hamas Leader Mahmoud Al-Zahhar Slams PA President for “Aimless Kangaroo-Like” Political Gymnastics and Says: We Will Not Relinquish Any Piece of Palestinian Land’ (Transcript of Excerpts from Television Interview with Hamas Leader Mahmoud al-Zahhar on Dream 1 TV), July 20, viewed 11 May 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-leader-mahmoud-al-zahhar-slams-pa-president-abbas-aimless-kangaroo-political-gymnastics-and/transcript
  3. [iii] Hamas 1988, ‘The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement’, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Library: The Avalon Project, viewed 11 May 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp
  4. [iv] ibid
  5. [v] ibid
  6. [vi] ibid
  7. [vii] ibid
  8. [viii] ibid
  9. [ix] ibid
  10. [x] ibid
  11. [xi] ibid
  12. [xii] Hamas 1988, op. cit.
  13. [xiii] U.S. Department of State 2017, ‘Defining Anti-Semitism’, January 20, viewed 14 May 2017, https://www.state.gov/s/rga/resources/267538.htm
  14. [xiv] Abu-Amr, Z. 1994, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, India University Press, United States of America, p. 16
  15. [xv] Hamas 1988, op. cit.
  16. [xvi] Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) 2010, ‘Morsi in 2010: No to Negotiations with the Blood-Sucking Warmongering “Descendants of Apes and Pigs”; Calls to Boycott U.S. Products’ (Transcript of Excerpts from Archival Interviews with Mohammed Morsi, September 23, viewed 14 May 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/morsi-2010-no-negotiations-blood-sucking-warmongering-descendants-apes-and-pigs-calls-boycott-us/transcript
  17. [xvii] Jerusalem Post 2017, ‘Hamas Says New Document ‘Not a Substitute for Founding Charter’, May 11, viewed 14 May 2017
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